E149

Anti-Fascist Economics w/ Isabella Weber

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Show Notes

Fascism is a word we hear thrown around a lot in conversations about tech politics. But we hear much less about the economics behind it. This week, Alix sat down with Isabella Weber, author of the new book Anti-Fascist Economics, to dig into that connection.

More like this: The Urge to Merge: Reclaiming Competition in an Economy of Giants w/ Alvaro Bedoya

Alix and Isabella get into how neoliberal economic policies fuel inequality and create fertile ground for fascism, the long history of corporate power aligning with authoritarianism, and why a healthy economy depends on governments making sure the things we all need to live are affordable and accessible to everyone.

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Computer Says Maybe is produced by Kushal Dev, Marion Wellington, Zoe Trout, and Peter Price at Rethink Audio.

Hosts

Alix Dunn

Release Date

November 20, 2026

Episode Number

E149

Transcript

This is an autogenerated transcript and may contain errors.

Alix: Hey there, this is Alex Dunn. Welcome back to Computer Says Maybe, where I talk to the people pushing back on tech power and fighting for something better. This week, I'm super excited to share my conversation with Isabella Weber, author of the new book, Anti-Fascist Economics. Fascism is a word we hear thrown around a lot in conversations about tech politics, but very rarely do we hear the combination of fascism and economics, and I read loads of books, uh, many of them excellent but every once in a while, I read one that kind of breaks my brain in the best way and makes me question things I thought I knew a lot about.

The book is fascinating, really timely, and totally changed the way I think about economics, so I really hope you enjoy the conversation. We talk about how neoliberal economic policies fuel inequality and pave the way for fascism, the historic ties between corporate power and authoritarianism, and why healthy economy actually needs governments to make sure essential goods and services are affordable and accessible to everyone.

Before we jump in, I also wanted to share the exciting news that we are hosting a live stream with Naomi Klein and Astra Taylor on December 1st. They are the authors of the recently released End Times Fascism, which is another excellent book that kind of broke my brain. Tickets are by donation, and all proceeds will go to Memphis Community Against Pollution, one of my favorite environmental justice organizations that longtime listeners will know about, and it's also heavily featured as a sort of full chapter in End Times Fascism.

I think one of the highlights of the whole book. So please do come post US Midterms Election in Brazil. It feels like a moment to really dig into their book, um, because it feels like maybe the dawn is breaking a bit, um, in some of the apocalyptic frames, uh, that we have been so saturated in for what feels like years.

So we are excited to have them, excited to have you, and, uh, looking forward to that on December 1st. All right. Let's get into my conversation with Isabella Weber.

Isabella: Hi, I'm Isabella Weber, author of Anti-Fascist Economics and a professor of economics at the University of Massachusetts Amherst. Anti-fascist economics is about putting a floor under people's livelihoods and a ceiling on, um, extreme forms of concentration of private and corporate wealth.

Alix: Mm-hmm.

Isabella: And then the flip side to this is that, you know, fascism thrives on economic insecurity and thrives on extreme forms of, uh, corporate concentration and concentration of private power in the economy.

Now, both this floor and the ceiling basically are affected by these inflation shocks, so you get this shock like the pandemic, which creates all sorts of bottlenecks, or like the Russian attack on Ukraine, or the US-Israeli attack on Iran, which, um, I mean, all of these instances we've had the prices of essentials spiking, and as they spike, the flip side is windfall profits, right?

Like, when the fossil fuel prices spike, the flip side is fossil fuel windfall profits, as we are just living through again as we speak. And then the question is, how do these price increases at the beginning of the value chain percolate through the system? And what our research shows is that these shocks basically help coordinate price increases across the economy, which then translates these initial shocks into generalized inflation.

And since this is an inflation that is very heavily skewed towards essentials like energy first and foremost, um, but also food, transportation, often also insurance, you know, like things that, that we can't do without Then this is an inflation that hits poorer households and even middle income households much harder than high income households.

And as such, you get these like two channels of redistribution. One is the composition of consumption. If you're poor, you spend the largest share of your income on the stuff that you can't do without. If you are rich, you don't spend all of your income to begin with and then because you save part of it and you invest part of it, right?

And then the part that you share, you, um, only share a much smaller fraction on, on essentials. So through, through that, you know, consumption composition channel, you get an increase in inequality, but also through the profit channel because, um, profits are extremely unequally distributed. You know, uh, we like to talk about pension funds being invested in the stock market.

Um, and we have been going through a lot of financialization of our pension systems, yet it's really the richest of the rich that, that have disproportionately large holdings in the stock market. So we did this analysis for the fossil fuel sector in the United States for 2022, where we found that 50% of the record profits in, in the fossil fuel industry went to the top 1% and the bottom 50% only got about 1%.

And then you also have this very skewed racial distribution where, you know, we have 14% of Black Americans, I think 12% Hispanic, um, and yet, you know, they only get, I think 1 to 2% in shares in these profits. So again, you know, like it's very disproportionately wide so that you get it in terms of communities affected by price increases of essentials.

There's also a racial dimension to this. And then if you add to this, um, hiking interest rates to increase unemployment, you get yet again a racial impact because, um, Black unemployment rates in the US tend to be structurally higher than, um, white unemployment rates. And this also means that if you increase unemployment, it hits Black communities harder than white communities.

What is happening here is that the ways in which we deal with inflation is treating people's livelihoods as collateral damage. Like we first treat them as collateral damage when we say, "Oh, we just need to let these prices explode because we have to preserve the price signal." And that's, you know, our overarching principle of how we run the economy.

But then secondly, if we, you know, throw people out of work or if that's our goal, I mean, l- last time around it actually didn't really work, um, because, uh, the fiscal policy basically buffered the monetary policy. But if, I mean, if this is our goal, right, to increase unemployment, then we are also literally treating people's livelihoods as collateral damage because their families will suffer, their communities will suffer, their children will suffer, the education prospects for their children will suffer, and so on.

And this is this part of neoliberalism that has this, um, you know, social Darwinist kernel Where there is a certain convergence with fascist logic. I'm not saying they are the same, but this, you know, shared social Darwinist idea of some people's livelihoods just have to be sacrificed for the greater good, that is kind of a point of convergence that can become very dangerous.

Alix: Yeah, I mean, I think I wanna get into concentration of corporate power and the kind of connection that economic instability has with fash- rise of fascism. But on this point, I mean, on, on this idea that economic pain for the poorest is the only path out of economic crisis, when you combine that with this unearned arrogance about the precision of economics as a field, there's something really...

Like, your book is, is, is incredible at kind of drawing out this, yeah, this arrogance of the field of economics. Like, the... I- you had a Friedman quote basically saying that, you know, he thinks of economics like physics, like it's, like it's some... While at the same time being incredibly inaccurate at predicting things that come down the pike.

And I wonder, I don't know, could you say a little bit about how we arrived at a state where essentially a logic of an ac- academic discipline reached such levels of confidence and certainty when the stakes for the poor were so high? Like, they continued to make these policy choices and pretend like they were scientific choices when they were really political decisions made on behalf of basically everyone.

Like, how did, how did we get there?

Isabella: It is a good question, like, how did we get here, right? And I mean, economics was at some point more pluralist than it is. Like, and that, that's part of the story that I'm telling in the book how specifically after World War II, there was actually this almost hegemonic belief that planning was possible and that government management was possible, which in parts, um, was a result of the war, where during World War II the United States had implemented very far-reaching forms of government control, and, uh, basically all belligerent powers had implemented forms of planning.

I mean, of course the fascist states, but also the democratic states. And therefore, you know, after the war, the question was, "If we can do this for war, why can't we do it for peace?" And all the arguments that economists had long put forward that, you know, government planning must fail, that it must be disastrous, that it's going to be in- inefficient and all of that, um, were just to a considerable degree delegitimized by the experience of the war where in the United States there was actually, um, much less planning during the First World War than during the Second World War.

And, um, in the Second World War you had higher GDP growth and lower inflation than in the First World War. So, you know, under these conditions of war, planning had really proved quite effective by the standards that economists themselves use. So I think that is an important part of seeing why you get this different mindset in the immediate post-war period.

And then of course also the threat of socialist revolutions, right? Um, where you had- That, like, literal system competition. And if socialism is, um, knocking your door, it's maybe more difficult to say, "Sorry, there's nothing that we can do for you because you're in a market economy." So I think these are all, like, kind of structural, um, considerations in thinking about the context in which economics, um, evolves.

Um-

Alix: So then at some point in, I guess, the late '70s after the Volcker Shock, which you outline in the book in a very... It's, it's a... I learn more in I think that section of the book than any other section. But then there's this sense that basically the only thing you can do in the face of inflation is to r- raise interest rates, that high unemployment is the necessary path through when there's an economic crisis, and that there's just this hegemonic logic that, like, I, reading your book, I realized how steeped I was in it also.

Like, it was this really interesting exercise in kind of being a little bit, like, deprogrammed, it felt like, at points, um, when reading the book. Because when you were describing, I mean, you had a, you have a very clear suggestion for government intervention at points of inflation that are affecting the price of essential goods in the shape of price controls, and even just, like, the reaction that you received from making that modest suggestion or, like, attempting to create conversation around is it appropriate to have spikes in fossil fuel prices that create huge windfalls for fossil fuel companies and drive up prices of essentials for the poor and people less well off, maybe we should fix prices in those moments so that there's not these huge surges that have these effects on our broader economy, there were...

People were, like, pissed.

Isabella: Yeah. Um, I mean, maybe it's actually worth bringing McCarthyism in for a second. Uh, so in- We love that ... in this question, in, in this question of, you know, how has e- economics evolved? I- in the book I write a little bit about Modigliani, who was, um, an Italian, um, economist who fled fascism and then, um, initially actually set out as a pretty socialist, um, thinker, um, in the United States, a kind of a socialist Keynesian.

And then, like, with the onset of McCarthyism, started to really hide his political views behind a lot of math. Um, and then became a very mainstream kind of Keynesian to the point that he has actually some points of convergence, um, with Milton Friedman in, in, in some of the key parts of his theorizing.

And I mean, I'm still trying to figure out to what extent he is representative for a larger tendency, but I do think that there is an element of McCarthyism encouraging this ma- mathematization and thereby, you know, moving some of the political messages into something very cryptic and making it, you know, less accessible to the public and as such, less vulnerable to, um, the kind of political attacks that academics, um, were suffering during the McCarthyist years.

Now, we definitely saw this mathematization of economics and the so-called n- neoclassical synthe- sy- synthesis that resided in, in some sense, in an impoverished form of Keynesianism, and this then became the target of attack of, um, Milton Friedman, who then, like, on top of the, you know, actually change the nature of Keynesianism, also portrays it in an even more straw man-ish, kind of way.

So, um, basically, Friedman reduces it to the question of the Phillips curve, um, where in the Phillips curve you have this trade-off between unemployment and inflation. So whenever the government spends more, you know, it can create, um, employment, but by, um, creating employment, it also creates, um, inflationary pressures.

So therefore, the line of argument becomes, you know, we have to accept a certain level of inflation because, um, that's what ne- what's necessary to bring unemployment down. Now, after the war, large swathes of economists actually thought that you could have it all, that you could have full employment and low inflation, um, because, um, you could get there with forms of government management that, you know, basically helped you manage the inflationary pressures in ways that government spending did not automatically result in inflation going up.

Friedman then, uh, you know, interprets the Phillips curve basically as something where, you know, when the government spends more money, then yes, it's true that for a first moment unemployment goes down, but then people realize that this was actually just, um, more money going around the economy so it doesn't have any material impact.

So then eventually you just get inflation going up, um, and unemployment pretty much staying where it is. This is vast simplification of Friedman's pretty complex argument, and in, in, in the book I am deriving this more carefully, but that's kind of the upshot of what he's arguing, right? So this means that whenever the government spends more money, it ends up, um, just generating inflation.

So where before you kind of, you know, had this trade-off, um, it now just becomes a bad thing, which, um, of course is a s- similar logic to the fascist virus because the government, you know, goes in with good intentions trying to create employment, but actually what it does is just, um, induce inflation. Now, in the '70s, we had an inflation that coincided with high unemployment, right?

So the story of, um, having high unemployment and high inflation was inconsistent with the idea that if the government spends more, it brings down unemployment, and on the surface of it was consistent with, um, Friedman's story that, um, you know, um, government spending would never really solve anything. It would just really induce inflation and, and unemployment keeps high.

So on that, you know, on that, like, very superficial level, Friedman's story holds, and we can talk about why this was not actually the case. But in any case, that is then the legacy, like on a general level, that we take away, um, from the 1970s, where you either have this monetarist interpretation where it's basically, you know, you are not supposed to do anything, even in terms of government spending, or it's the Phillips curve, which was the, the, the straw man in a way that, um, that Friedman was up against.

I mean, of course the Phillips curve existed before, but it was by no means as, you know, universal the economics that he replaced, that he made it out to be. And that is then the setting against which the inflation debate happens in, in the wake of the, um, COVID-19 pandemic. This was a very long derivation of the history of this.

Um, but the point being that then, you know, when, when inflation hits, we basically have, um, two camps in terms of what we should be doing against inflation. Camp, camp one was, uh, Camp Austerity, um, where the idea was that the rescue packages were way too large, that there shouldn't have been government spending on that level in response to the pandemic, and that what this government spending did was to induce inflation, so therefore it had to be, um, reversed, um, by hiking interest rates, um, and, uh, ultimately aiming to, um, you know, throw people out of work because the economy was running too hot.

So that's kind of... I mean, even though many of the people who argued for this would not necessarily describe themselves as Friedmanite, but that's like... I mean, it's, it's broadly speaking the Friedman kind of story or like kind of the, the Phillips curve, um, kind of story, right? Because the idea is that you have this trade-off between inflation and, um, unemployment and therefore, you know, like to bring inflation down you have to bring, um, unemployment up.

So these two versions are, uh, I mean Different ways of arriving at the same conclusion that, that there was too much government spending . Yeah. But in both cases, the idea is that you have to impose macroeconomic tightening. Now, the, like aga- measured against this, the progressive edge of the debate was so-called Team Transitory, which was arguing that, um, you know, we should be tolerating this kind of inflation because this inflation was set off by shocks to specific sectors such as, um, the computer chip sector, such as the shipping sector, such as the energy sh- sector.

And these price spikes were going to unleash an inflation bout, but will eventually peter out. Like, I mean, those prices shoot up, then they push other prices up, and then, you know, this inflation shock is transitory. So therefore, we should just wait and see and let the storm pass. It was progressive because it, it stepped up to defend the rescue packages, and the rescue packages under Biden were a, a market break with what Obama had done, where Obama had drastically reduced the ambition of the rescue packages in response to the financial crisis as a result of the recommendation of Larry Summers, very specifically.

He was the chair of his Council of Economic Advisors. And, um, the consequence of this was, um, you know, prolonged unemployment and low growth, and it actually also, again, like specifically higher Black unemployment because you always have this match between white and, and, and Black unemployment structurally speaking.

So against that background, it was progressive to defend the, the rescue packages, right? But as I was watching this debate as someone who grew up in a family on a budget, I was like, "I mean, wait a minute, it can't be the case that, um, coming out of a pandemic where, you know, again, low-income communities had suffered very disproportionately, had, you know, had to keep going to work, had to expose themselves, um, to the virus, um, saw disproportionately members of their communities die, contract long COVID and try, you know, like cleaning toilets while you have long C- COVID or something, right?

It's bad enough if you sit at your computer, but try doing, doing manual work, right? Um, so and then now we, we as economists come in and say like, "Oh, don't worry, you know, this is just a temporary shock in, um, energy prices, in food prices, in transportation prices. Um, and, uh, you know, in two, three years it will be over.

Um, don't worry, the storm will pass." Because obviously, I mean, if you are on a budget, right? And you have to feed your family, you have to feed your children, you have to feed yourself, and someone goes like, "Oh, don't worry, it's just two, three years of toast and beans, you know and things will be fine again."

Wow. It's just not good enough of a response. Um, and then if you add the profits dynamic- To it that we talked about in the beginning and the redistribution dynamic that, you know, this kind of inflation brings about, then I think we have to question whether it's even a progressive response. It's progressive measured against Team Austerity, but is it really progressive if we, if our starting point is that already before the inflation we have had an inequality crisis, and already before inflation we have had an economic insecurity crisis, you know?

Then, um, we have to do better. And, um, what I argued in this Guardian op-ed was going back to the 1940s debates where actually economists across schools of thought, um, were of the opinion that when you have a situation where there is a bottleneck, where supply isn't forthcoming because of reasons that are extra economic, let's say, um, it's a ship that got stuck in the Suez Canal and it takes time until that ship is removed from the Suez Canal, or let's say it's a massive traffic jam in front of the Port of LA because a sh- global shipping system got out of whack, um, as a result of the pandemic, or let's say gas isn't flowing to Europe because you have Putin attacking Ukraine and you have sa- sanctions in response , then all of these, uh, situations where, you know, prices shooting up is not gonna restore supply, definitely not in, in, in the short run because it just takes time until that ship is removed from the Suez Canal.

You know, it takes time until the Port of LA is clear again. And in fact, what is more, if shipping companies experience that, um, the emergency actually ends up being the most profitable times that they have ever had in the long history of their companies and freight rates have increased five, six, seven, eight times over, then assuming that, you know, this freight rate increase would mean that they are in a rush of getting out of the situation that they are in is, quite frankly, naive.

And I actually went and visited the Port of LA and spoke to folks there, and they also said, like, companies were not in a rush of getting out of those, um, traffic jams because it was, um, a, a gold rush for them, right? And then the Biden administration actually intervened with the Supply Chain Task Force, like creating all sorts of measures to help make the port work again.

But it was not the invisible hand of, um, exploding prices, but it was actually the very visible hand of the Biden administration intervening here to bring the, the port back on track. So in these kind of situations, if you do a price stabilization measure, you do not get the record profits that, um, companies have been benefiting off, but you actually also do not have a situation where you somehow constrain supply by doing a price stabilization.

The price stabilization is a response to the breakdown in supply and not the cause of the breakdown of supply.

Alix: One of my takeaways from your book too is that the historical examples you used in the future are only going to be more frequent. So figuring out what we do in these moments in a way that doesn't dramatically accelerate inequality feels absolutely essential

Isabella: Like, we are basically living through a crisis of disintegration, where, where a lot of the institutions that, you know, are used to keep our economy going, um, crumbling, are no longer holding.

I mean, if you look at what Trump is doing, he's basically engineering shocks, right? And he's not facing a lot of resistance against this, which, um, from the powerful business elites, 'cause they have learned that those shocks can actually be incredibly profitable, right? Um, so if you look at what's happening with profits for big oil right now, then the Iran war is, you know, generating, once more, record profits that, um, depending on how much longer this, um, this, uh, war will last, might actually, um, even, uh, you know, outsize the ones that we had in the wake of the Iran war.

For refinery profit margins, we have already seen them exceed those, um, during, during the, um, Ukraine war. So in that situation, you also get, like, a very clear misalignment of incentives, if one wants to speak like an economist, right? Where the companies that are running the essential sectors are learning that when it's the worst of times, um, in terms of them delivering their goods and services, it ends up being the best of times for their bottom line.

And that is a disaster capitalism on steroids that really is, um, I mean, literally putting the foundations of humanity on this planet at risk, right? So when the AI folks, um, come out and someone like Sam Altman already said in 2015 that, you know, AI might well lead to the extinction of humanity, but in the course, wonderful businesses will have been created , then this is this kind of, you know, um, end times profiteering where it's, like, literally...

I mean, it's no longer even just, you know, some poor folks' jobs that are being sacrificed. Now a bunch of people in the colonies whom- whose lives you didn't care much for to begin with were sacrificed. It's literally like sacrificing, I mean, like, saying, like, "We are prepared to sacrifice humanity as a whole," right?

So that's where, like, this, the same logic kind of comes back as a boomerang on, on steroids.

Alix: So you talk about price stabilization. Like, how does, how would that actually work in practice?

Isabella: So one of the key messages of anti-fascist economics is to say that we have to think sectorally and that we have to treat the essentials different from non-essential sectors.

Um, and in the essential sectors, we have to look at every sector to decide what the right policies are. So if we take, um, the example of housing, then I actually think that, um, you know, forms of rent control Are possible. If you, um, uh, do a price measure like a rent control, then you have to combine it with measures that address the underlying crisis, um, which can be things like constraining the access of private equity to your housing market.

It can be things like, you know, building out the public housing stock. In the German case where socialization is protected by the Constitution, socialization of very large, um, uh, corporate landlords with, um, market power can also be a tool to, you know, structurally address price pressures in your, in your housing market.

Given that the climate crisis is kind of the underlying crisis of a lot of the shocks that we face, we also have to increase the housing supply in a way where we are building green, because that is just an, you know, an imperative, um, if we want to get out of the crisis that we are in. If we look at something like, um, the energy market, then, um, energy prices are incredibly volatile, um, and no one company sets the price of energy.

Even the very large, um, oil companies like Chevron and Exxon cannot actively set the price of oil, right? Um, so there, um, I think we need to have a, a buffer stock systems where basically you have public stockholding and you do a form of open market, um, operations, um, where you buy oil when the prices are very low and you sell oil, um, when the prices are very high.

And the goal should be to do this in an internationally coordinated fashion, and ideally to pull together Such a, a, a, a size of, um, buyer's, um, power on these markets that you can't actually defend a price ceiling. This is more difficult for oil than it is for gas, but for gas, um, the European Union has actually, um, put such a gas price break, um, on its books towards the end of the, um, 2022, two thou- 2023 global energy crisis, um, where they said the European Union is such an important, um, buyer in, um, in the global gas market that if we say we are not going to buy above price X, then we can't actually, you know, set a ceiling in the gas wh- wholesale market.

For oil it's a bit more complicated. You would probably need to pool more players together. I don't think it's impossible. It's more ambitious for sure. But in any case, um, the, the, the goal should be to move towards a logic of, uh, stabilizing oil prices, um, to not collapse too low because we don't want, um, oil prices to be too cheap as we are transitioning into renewable energies.

Yeah. We don't want... You know, if we actually manage to build out renewables for oil pr- and gas prices to collapse to a point that, um, companies that can still switch back, switch back- They will ... into fossil fuels. Yeah. Yeah. So that's why we need a, a, a price floor along with working towards setting up institutions that can defend a price ceiling.

And then of course we need to build out the renewable energy system, um, and we need to build it out in a way where we are not replicating the power structures that we have in the energy sy- system right now. Yeah. Not least because this is a democracy question, and that is actually one of the insights in the book where I've looked quite a bit at, um, you know, how economists in the '40s have been thinking about an economics of never again.

And they were very adamant that who controls the essentials actually has control over the fate of economy and society as a whole, right? Um, and therefore control over essentials, um, has to be in, in public hands for democracy to be meaningful. And this is something that we are relearning in the energies crisis that we are living through, right?

Um, I mean, who controls energy is literally controlling our whole economy, right? So therefore I think we need, um, everything that is large scale network, um, shaped- To be publicly owned. So the grid needs to be publicly owned, but also, you know, large scale, um, solar parks, large scale, um, wind parks, hydropower, um, which, which tends to be very large scale, um, infrastructure-size, um, plants.

Um, these kind of things need to be publicly owned. Of course, if you have a backyard and you want to have a solar cell there, you should have a solar cell there. That should be encouraged. And if you want to have, um, solar cells on your rooftop, please have solar cells on your rooftop and that too should be encouraged.

But, um, you know, so this small ca- scale stuff of course should be private and that should be built out as quickly as possible, too. But for the large scale infrastructure scale things that, that need to be created, I just think it has to be, it has to be public and it has to be pulled off in an all government, um, effort.

If we look at something like food, it's a very different situation from energy because, I mean, food is extremely heterogeneous, right? Like, if you go to a supermarket, you'll find, I don't know, 200 brands of tomato sauce, right? So like, I don't think we can say that like this should somehow be all of it publicly controlled, but what can be publicly controlled is a basket of staple food items that represents, you know, some nu- nutritious, um, baseline that ev- everybody should be able to afford.

Mm-hmm. And such baskets actually exist in most countries because, um, for, you know, determining the levels of social benefits, governments usually draw up such baskets. Um, not in terms of providing the baskets, but in terms of the, the price structure of the basket. So what the Mexican government did is to, um, strike a, an agreement be- between large scale, um, grocery stores, um, and the government, um, uh, to stabilize the price of a basket of such, um, food staples.

Um, and the companies got some incentives in return. Um, but what is key is that the president herself actually is, you know, making sure that there's compliance with, with this agreement, um, by holding a regular press conference where she reports on how well or poorly the companies are doing in implementing this basket policy.

And I think what, what this does is that, um, you know, she goes out and literally says, "I, as the head of state, am responsible for you being able to afford-" food, which is the exact opposite logic of what we have seen under neoliberalism, where political elites have been saying, you know, "Democracy is the greatest of all systems, and we should all be fighting for the survival of democracy," which I of course subscribe to.

But then, uh, the second sentence is kind of, uh, unfortunately, even when it comes to the basic stuff that you can't do without, even in the middle of an emergency, even when companies are shown to be price gouging on you, even when we have record profits, um, and you are squeezed to the edge, I cannot intervene because this would be against the market.

Alix: And then I'm surprised that people take extreme political action in the face of that failure of government to provide those basic things. Like, it's so, it's so obvious where that goes, and it's so interesting how consistently surprised economic, uh, figures have been that people get angry enough to do political things that might not make longer term sense 'cause they, they can't afford to live.

Isabella: Yeah, I mean, it's like people just go anything but the status quo, right? Yeah. The status quo has become unbearable for me. Give me anything- Yeah ... but this, right? That's basically where we have landed. Yeah. Uh, and that this kind of anger then also leads to scapegoating and, um, xenophobia and anti-migrant action and so on, I think is pretty obvious.

And then often, like, the reaction is like, "Oh, but we have looked at the polls, and people say that they're also against migrants." And I'm like, "Yes, they're also against migrants, but, like, where is... From which place is this coming from," right? And I'm- Yeah ... I'm not saying that there hasn't been a problem with racism and xenophobia and so on in Western societies for a while.

But when it g- comes to these, you know, moments of scarcity and pressure and, you know, heightened insecurity, the violence with which these sentiments, um, break out increases, and I think that's, that's what we have been seeing.

Alix: Yeah. Okay, well I wanna turn to concentration of corporate power because I think this was a very good explanation of the role you think the state should play to ensure basic affordability of essential goods.

But in parallel, you have these companies, um, that are consolidating power, and that that also has a connection to the construct of fascism, which you have this amazing story of, I think it's Alfred Krupp, uh, in, in a meeting with Hitler before the 1933 election when they're talking about the fusion of industrial powers and the, and Hitler's project.

Um, do you wanna just give us a little taste of that history of, of, of how monopoly power and indus- industrial leaders in Germany in the early 1930s saw the rise of Hitler as sort of benefiting this... Like, have the, a mutually kind of affinity and, uh, kind of, I don't know project that they were working on.

Can you describe that?

Isabella: Yeah. Uh, I mean, there has been longstanding debate amongst historians around the precise role of industry in the rise of Hitler, but then there comes this moment where it becomes clear that, um, you know, they are at the cusp of power. And at that point, I think it's, um, it's, it's quite clear that their allegiances come out in the open and that, you know, especially the German heavy industry actually, um, is, uh, very much ready to join forces with the Nazis.

And I mean, one of the important things to keep in mind here is that of course, um, there wa- was also massive socialist and communist mobilization, right? So I think for many it felt like kind of a, the center isn't holding type of a moment. And then the question is, you know, whose side are you on ? And, uh, the moment that the, the Nazis, um, were on track of, um, gaining power, heavy industry was, um, quite prepared to join forces with them, and it actually became an incredibly profitable arrangement, especially for heavy industry, where you got this corporatist merger between, um, state power and corporate power, and where the extreme forms of corporate concentration and partialization of the German economy actually made this merger very organic and, um, uh, possible, um, very fast.

So in that sense, you know, there's a certain irony where Marx of course argued that, um, corporate, uh, concentration or capital concentration and centralization would eventually reach, um, a degree which would enable planning in, in the sense of, uh, a, a, a socialist, um, revolution and socialist planning, right?

And what we actually have seen historically is that this level of, uh, corporate concentration then enabled this corporatist arrangement with the fascist state.

Alix: Yeah, there was the Roosevelt quote too, which I had never heard

Isabella: So there is this amazing Roosevelt quote saying, "The first truth is that the liberty of a democracy is not safe if the people tolerate the growth of private power to a point where it becomes stronger than their democratic state itself.

That, in its essence, is fascism. Ownership of government by an individual, by a group, or by any other controlling private power." Now we can of course debate whether fascism also requires racism, um, the myth of a glorious past, um, forms of terror- Mm-hmm ... and so on. But I think it's definitely one key element of, of fascism, this, you know, corporatist, um, arrangement of, of a merger between these extreme forms of private power and the state.

And the irony is, of course, that, I mean, I'm not saying Trump is the same as Hitler. I think they are very different historical figures. Um, nevertheless, um, I think it's quite striking how you see this merger, um, of power between Trump and his government and the AI industry, where AI, in a way, is, um, you know, the heavy industry of the '30s and '40s.

Um, uh, back then it was all about, you know, um, cannons and tanks and, you know, this like heavy gear that you needed to, um, rearm. And today the arms race is really about AI and digital technology, surveillance technologies and all of that, right? Um, and in both cases, government procurement, um, plays a massive role so that, you know, this, um, structural merging of power, I think, is something that we see again in a pretty, pretty clear fashion.

Actually, Henry Wallace, the vice president of Roosevelt and almost, uh, president of the United States, "American fascism will not be really dangerous until there's a purposeful coalition between the cartelists, the deliberate poisoners of public information, and those who stand for the KKK type of demagoguery."

So it's like, uh, I mean, these elements we clearly, I mean- Yeah ... have in plain sight, right?

Alix: Yeah. It's really wild, the corollary of some of the quote... Like quotes, some of the quotes were just felt almost like it was too good. It was too on the nose, um, for the moment- Yeah ... uh, we're in now.

Isabella: I mean, I wrote this book really out of an sense of urgency, like basically reflecting on this experience in the inflation debate, where I felt like we can no longer pretend as if economics has nothing to do with democracy, right?

And then I started researching this, and I, I was just, I just kept stumbling upon these quotes. I was like, "This is, like this is incredible." Like I didn't... I, I mean, it's not like, you know, I did like years of research and compiled all these quotes and then thought like, "Oh, let's write a book." It was really the other way around, and I think there's so much more out there on the economics of never again.

So this is really a call for papers for anyone out there who, you know, wants to c- continue this work. I think there's a, a treasure trove of history that we need to go back to in terms of how economists and economic thinkers and political leaders, um, in the '40s have been thinking about this relationship.

Alix: I was really struck by how little I knew about the history and how much it was, um, paralyzing now and how it seems we didn't learn. It, it, there were these moments where you could see, and you did a great job of kind of bringing them to the fore, where it was like we had a choice. There was a path, and we took the wrong path, and then we learned a lot.

Yes. And then we confronted the same set of options and then chose the wrong thing again. Like, it felt very, um, like, uh, you could kind of sense this repeating our mistakes. Obviously every situation is, is unique, but it was a really, um... Hopefully we can learn more from these histories.

Isabella: One of the projects of the book is really to try to denaturalize the economy.

So economists have- Yeah ... this urge to think about the economy as if it was governed by laws that are akin to laws of nature, right? And unfortunately, I think Marxist economists can be about as guilty of this as neoclassical economists. So what I'm trying to argue is, you know, of course there are pattern and there are structures, and it's important to try to understand these bigger driving forces, but the concrete ways in which they play out is always socially determined.

So in that sense- Mm-hmm ... there is agency, right? There is the possibility to make change because it's not, at the end of the day, about nature, but it's about society, and economy sits within society, so therefore we can change things.

Alix: Yeah. I mean, I have one more question for you, uh, and that is, most of the policy prescriptions that come from either libertarians who are interested in tech money, you know, I don't know, making society better, but without government having to intervene, talk about universal basic income.

You talk about universal basic services, which I think is an interesting distinction. But the other piece that seems like it's a policy prescription people are suggesting is a wealth tax, which feels like It's taxing concentration of wealth after it's been accumulated, and it seems like in your argument you're saying that we wanna prevent that massive concentration of wealth to begin with.

But can you, just a couple of thoughts on those two policy prescriptions, universal basic income and wealth tax as a, as a kind of set of policy things that sit alongside some of the recommendations you have on government intervention?

Isabella: So for me, the problem with the universal basic income is that, you know, it leaves everything intact, and then everybody gets a bit of cash in their pockets to keep the machine running.

And in fact- Yeah ... that's why Milton Friedman actually loved the idea of a universal basic income, because it meant that you could, uh, basically, you know, abolish all state capacity and, um, fix the problem that some people die in the free market economy by just giving them some cash. So the counterpoint to this is, um, an economics of essentials, as I'm arguing, where it's really about rebuilding state capacity and public control starting from the essential sectors.

And as you are doing this, you are actually also creating jobs, and you're creating meaningful jobs. Um, and you're creating jobs in a way that you use them to shape the economy in the ways in which, um, as a democracy you want, you want it to be shaped. Um- Mm-hmm ... so in that sense, it's, it's actually a counterpoint to, um, the idea of a universal basic income.

Now, when it comes to a wealth tax, you know, higher corporate taxes, taxing the rich, um, I'm actually very much on board with this because I think at the core, you know, we need to put a floor under people's livelihoods and we need to put a ceiling, um, on extreme forms of, um, wealth concentration. And for that we need To change the structure of the economy on the one hand, but we also need measures that can work in the here and now.

Mm-hmm. So, you know, just like a price control cannot solve the structural problems, but it can buy time, these kind of taxes cannot solve the structures that, um, you know, bring about, um, the distribution of income from the bottom to the top in the first place, but they can, you know, um, intervene in the here and now in ways in which changing the structures cannot because that takes time.

So that's why I am actually for combining, you know, the tax agenda with the structuralist agendas and, by the way, um, also combining it with a tough antitrust enforcement that includes the breakup of large companies. Um, I think on the progressive side, we have for a long time been, uh, you know, siloed into these different agendas where, you know, "Oh, if I'm a Brandeis antitrust person, then I'm so different from you, who is a kind of a structuralist green planning person, that there's not much that unites us."

And I think that's exactly wrong because I think what unites us is that we all want to create an economy that is not a profit fundamentalist and that is not just working for large corporations and the rich. So in that sense, I am for very pragmatic alliances in order to build up countervailing powers to help us fight our way out of this pretty gloomy situation that we have ended up in.

Alix: A huge thank you to Isabella for joining us and for such a fascinating conversation. You can find the book linked in the show notes, so do buy it, read it, buy it for your friends . Uh, buy it for your policymakers. I also wanna say a huge thank you to all of you listening and supporting the show over the years.

If you haven't seen it, we recently won both a Signal Award and two Lovie Awards, which is so exciting, and it really wouldn't have happened without you, so thank you for listening, for those of you that voted in the People's Choice Award at the Lovies, uh, and just generally for, like, writing in when you do, saying, um, how you feel about the show and the things it makes you think about, um, 'cause it keeps us going.

Next week, we have something a little different and special planned for you. I don't wanna give too much away. You'll just have to tune in to find out. And finally, a big thanks to the podcast team, Kushal Dev, Marion Wellington, and Zoe Trout, and to Peter Price at Rethink Audio for all of their work making the show happen every week, and we will see you next time.

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